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A MODEL OF CHECK EXCHANGE
Abstract
We construct and simulate a model of check exchange to examine the incentives a bank
(or a bank clearinghouse) has to engage in practices that limit access to its payment facilities, in
particular delaying the availability of check payment.  The potentially disadvantaged bank has the
option of directly presenting checks to the first bank.  We find that if the retail banking market is
highly competitive, the first bank will not engage in such practices, but if the retail banking
market is imperfectly competitive, it will find it advantageous to restrict access to its facilities. 
Lower costs of direct presentment can reduce (but not eliminate) the range over which these
practices are employed.  The practice of delayed presentment can either reduce or increase
welfare, again depending on the degree of competition in the market.  The model suggests that,
were the Federal Reserve System to exit the business of check processing, practices such as
delayed presentment would be more prevalent.3
I. Introduction
Check exchange involves banks’ collecting the checks of other banks and presenting
them to the bank on which they were drawn, and receiving checks presented to them and paying
for the valid checks.  Underlying this activity is some agreement to exchange the checks, and this
agreement specifies acceptable forms of payment, times and places of presentment, and so on. 
Clearinghouses represent such agreements by groups of banks.  Alternatively, if banks cannot
agree to terms of check exchange, each has the right to directly present checks to the other. 
Nonetheless, check exchange represents an interconnected system of exchange in which a
depositor can pay some merchant for a good by check and the merchant can deposit that check in
its bank, despite the fact that the merchant and the depositor have different banks. 
Interconnected systems of exchange create unique incentives and behavior by the parties to the
exchanges: each bank is both a competitor and a supplier of intermediate goods to its rivals.
Credit card and automated teller machine systems, telephone systems, railroad interchanges, all
represent systems in which a transaction originated by one firm in the system may be completed
by another.  Usually, centralized organizations or government regulation govern the interchange
created by the interconnected system.
Check exchange in the U.S. is governed by law and regulation, and is also influenced by
the presence of the Federal Reserve System as a major processor of checks.  One major
difference, for example, between the system of check exchange and that of other interconnected
systems is the institution of par presentment.  In most of the interconnected systems previously
mentioned, a price is paid by one firm in the transaction to the other firm in the transaction, forIn some telephone systems, a similar system of interchange, called “bill and keep,” is
1
used.  The name suggests that the network that originates the call bills its customer and keeps all
the revenue (not sharing it with the network that completes the call). See Economides, Lopomo,
and Woroch, (1996a), for a discussion.  Fees for processing (sorting and transporting) of checks
are charged under par presentment, but “exchange charges” or “discounts” from the face value of
the checks are not.




the origination or completion of the transaction.  Checks operate with no price being paid for the
collection or payment for checks: this is known as par presentment.   Par presentment is now a
1
well-established fact of U.S. check exchange, but earlier in this century, many banks charged
“exchange” fees for the payment of checks drawn on accounts held by the bank.
The exchange of checks is subject to significant economies in sorting, transporting, and
exchanging items multilaterally.  By netting offsetting check payments, banks can significantly
reduce their costs of check collection and payment.  However, if a bank can impose costs on its
rivals, it may advantage itself in the retail banking market.   Hence the possibility exists that a
2
bank or banks that control access to a clearinghouse (or to their own facilities) would limit access
to rivals to gain advantages in the downstream market. 
Access can be limited by offering lower quality service or higher priced service to the
other bank.  Economides et al. (1996b) examine the incentives for a dominant firm in an
interconnected system to charge its rival high prices to interconnect with it.  In check exchange,
however, par presentment limits the ability of a bank or clearinghouse to charge its rivals high
prices.
We investigate the possibility that a bank would delay, by a day, payment for checks
drawn on its accounts.   Currently, the Federal Reserve System establishes “availability zones,” a5
system that determines the times by which checks are paid.  If the Fed were to exit the check
processing business, a clearinghouse or dominant correspondent bank might have the opportunity
and desire to delay payment to other banks relative to the current timetable.  
However, other banks have the right to directly present checks (and receive same-day
availability) to the bank that is attempting to delay availability.  Direct presentment is costly to
banks--both for the collecting and the paying bank--relative to (symmetric) clearinghouse
agreements.  The extra cost is incurred by the paying bank in additional (bank-specific) sorting
and transportation expense, and for the paying bank in additional (time-critical) account
reconciliation and higher-cost payment methods, such as Fedwire.  Hence, it is an open question
of whether the tactic of delaying availability is a profitable one.  
We construct and simulate a model of check exchange to examine the incentives a bank
(or a bank clearinghouse) has to delay the availability of check payment.  The model is similar to
the one introduced by Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1996).  The potentially disadvantaged bank has
the option of directly presenting checks to the first bank. 
Our model necessarily abstracts from many realistic features of the check exchange
market.  Our aim is to isolate those features of the market that are particular to check exchange,
without in any way “loading the dice” to convey excessive strategic advantage to one firm.
To this end, the firms are equal in size and technology, have similar location advantages,
and enjoy the same costs of check processing.  All check transportation and sorting are assumed
to be done at equal marginal and average costs for the two firms.  Hence, there are no advantages
granted to either firm by virtue of its rival being small or remote.  Furthermore, there are two
banks in the model.  As a result, there is no multilateral benefit to check exchange in the model. 6
One bank does not control access to a multilateral organization without which the other is at an
enormous disadvantage.  
The one advantage that one bank, called bank 1, is granted in the model is to decide
whether it wishes to impose delayed availability on bank 2.  The advantage is purely strategic, in
the sense that it is a first mover advantage, and not an economic advantage.  Bank 2 can respond
by directly presenting checks to bank 1.  
How are we to interpret the first mover advantage?  One interpretation of the two banks
in the model is that bank 1 is a branch of a national correspondent bank, while bank 2 is a
community bank, equal in size to bank 1.  Alternatively, bank 1 can be more loosely interpreted
as a clearinghouse and bank 2 as the set of banks not in the clearinghouse, and the clearinghouse
determines the availability zones (in this interpretation, the clearinghouse gains no superior
technology from multilateral clearing and settlement relative to bank 2).  Bank 1, by virtue of its
being the correspondent, or the clearinghouse, establishes the availability zones in the market,
subject to the threat of direct presentment by bank 2. 
Another important feature of the model is the nature of the competition for retail
customers.  The banks are assumed to be located in different spots.  Bank 1 is at point 0 on the
interval [0, 1], while bank 2 is at point 1.  The consumers in the model are uniformly distributed
across the interval.  Each consumer would prefer to have a bank right where she lives but, in
general, must suffer a travel cost, t per unit distance, to a bank.  Naturally, if the banks charge
equal prices, all consumers located to the left of .5 will travel to bank 1, and those to the right
will travel to 1 to do their banking.  However, if bank 1 lowers its price, it will attract some
consumers to the right of .5.  If the travel cost is zero, this is a model of perfect substitutability of7
the banks, and prices are competitive.  Hence we can interpret t as an index of competition: the
lower t is, the less pricing power the banks have over nearby customers, and the more
competitive is the outcome.  
We move on to the model in Section II.  In Section III we present a discussion of the
equilibrium incentives of the banks and the results of simulations of the model.  Section IV
provides discussion and interpretation, and Section V provides a summary and conclusion.
II. The Model
Two banks serve the market.  Serving a customer requires the expenditure of fixed costs,
f.  Customers are located (uniformly distributed) on the unit interval, [0,1].  The banks are
located at 0 and 1, the endpoints of the interval.   Consumers use banks for check transaction
services, q.  Banks charge explicit prices, p, i = 1,2, for deposit services.  Consumers write ii
checks to others on the unit interval in a uniform pattern.  We refer to this pattern as isotropic
check exchange.  This assumption implies that for equal prices of check services, inflow and
outflow of checks are balanced across banks (even if market shares are not).
Given income y, and check consumption q, a consumer located at x and using bank i has i
utility:
y + v  - t|x - x| + u(q), 0i i
where v  represents the fixed surplus from being able to write checks to anyone in the market (the 0
network effect), t|x - x| represents the cost of using a bank at address x (which is different from ii
where the consumer is located, x), and the variable gross surplus u(q).  We let i
u(q) = lnq. ii
This yields 8
u(q) = p if and only if q = (1/p).
/
ii i i
This assumption gives us unitary price elasticity of check demand.  
The consumer’s variable net surplus is equal to 
v(p) = max{u(q) - p q} = ln(1/p) - 1 = - lnp - 1. ii i i i i
For prices p  and p  charged by the banks for check services, market shares are 12
determined by consumers choosing the bank that yields the highest surplus.  So a consumer
at x =   is indifferent between the two banks if and only if:
v(p ) - t   = v(p ) - t (1-  ),  12
or:
 = (½) +   (v(p ) - v(p )),  12
where    = 1/(2t) is an index of substitutability between the banks.  In our case we have 
 = (½) +   (lnp  - lnp ) (1) 21
Note that (M /Mp)  =  -  (  /p ), and  (M /Mp)  =  (  /p ).  Average per-capita welfare is given by  11 2 2
W =   v(p ) + (1-  ) v(p ) - (t/2)(  + (1 -  )) . 12
22
The last term represents the average customer’s disutility from not being able to consume
banking services at her ideal location.  Substituting for v(p), we have  i
W =   (-ln(p ) - 1) + (1-  ) (- ln(p ) - 1) - (t/2)(  + (1 -  )) . 12
22
Providing check services is costly.  Each check transaction is assumed to incur costs of c
by the bank on which the check was drawn.  In addition, the process of collecting a check costs
(at least) h, by the bank that collects the check (whether the check was drawn on that bank or on
the other bank), and the process of paying a check costs h for the bank that pays the check (again
whether or not it was drawn on that bank).  In summary, there are costs to a bank to be in9
business, f; costs of account maintenance when the account has active transactions, c; and costs
of collecting, h, and paying, h, for any check transaction.  The assumption that the costs are the
same for “on-us” transactions as they are for “on-others” transactions is a conservative
assumption intended to highlight the strategic issues in check exchange while preserving
symmetry between on-us and on-others transactions to a greater degree than is empirically true. 
Throughout the paper, however, we will assume that the cost to collect and pay a check internally
is zero; that is we will assume that h = 0.  In the best of circumstances, under a clearinghouse
agreement the costs of collecting and paying a check externally is zero as well.  When other ways
of collecting and paying checks are introduced, the costs of collecting or paying the checks
externally will be greater than zero.
II.1. Symmetric clearinghouse agreement
In the initial “regime” that we consider, the banks have agreed to a clearinghouse, or
bilateral interchange agreement.  Under this agreement, the banks exchange their checks at a
convenient time and place, and each incurs cost, h, in collecting the other bank’s checks, which is
the same as if the check had been an on-us transaction.  The banks agree not to impede collection
of payment in any way.
Again, to simplify matters (and with no loss of generality for linear costs), we let h = 0. 
Collecting checks is done at zero cost (both internally and across banks).
A bank’s profit in this case is given by 
 =    [(p - c)q - f], for i = 1,2, and where     =   , and     = 1 -   .
C
ii ii 1 2
The first order conditions for maximization of profit are given by 
(M   /Mp)  =    [(p - c)(Mq /Mp) + q] + (M /Mp)[(p - c)q - f] = 0 , for i = 1,2.     
C
i1 i i i ii i i i10
From the first order conditions we find that 
(p - c)/p = (   +   f)/(   +   ) (2) ii i i
Equation 2 states that the price-cost margin for each firm is equal to a ratio depending on its
market share, the degree of substitutability between banks, and the fixed cost.   
Lemma 1: For sufficiently small levels of costs, f and c, there exists a unique, symmetric,
full coverage equilibrium in which both firms have equal market shares.  Hence      =     = (1/2).  12
Prices are then given by equation (2).
Proof.  Because the profit function is strictly concave, the first order condition specifies a
unique maximand. Hence, the existence and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium follow
from that fact and the continuity of the profit function.  For small fixed costs and marginal costs,
the equilibrium will be full coverage; that is,   will be 1/2 (all customers will be served by one of
the two banks).
 Because check demand has unitary price elasticity, and because of the isotropic check
demand, firms always break even on interchange business. ~
Notice that when the banks become perfectly substitutable (that is, when t = 0, or   = 4)
equation (2) shows that  (p - c)q = f. ii
In other words, when the check market is highly competitive, the prices charged are “Ramsey (or
contestable) prices.”  Ramsey prices are the lowest prices that satisfy the budget constraint. 
Vigorous competition between the banks is fully preserved under the bilateral interchange
agreement.11
II.2. Delayed availability
Now we consider the case in which bank 1, which is assumed to control the
clearinghouse,  imposes a cost on bank 2 for the collection of the checks of bank 1.  So for every
check of bank 1 that bank 2 collects, a cost, d, is imposed by bank 1 on bank 2.  Conversely, this
cost is enjoyed by bank 1 as additional revenue. This cost could be interpreted as “delayed
availability,” in which the dominant bank redefines the “availability zones” so as to have bank 2's
checks take an extra day to settle.  In this case bank 2 loses “float” earnings and bank 1 gains
them. It could also be interpreted as remote disbursement, in which the dominant firm issues its
checks from a point (say at -1 on the line) distant from the market, but continues to collect checks
from its merchants at its in-market location.  Now the profit functions are given by 
 =    [(p   -  c)q   -  f]  +        d q(p ) for bank 1, and 
A
11 11 1 2 1
 =    [(p   -  c)q   -  f]  -        d q(p ) for bank 2.
A
22 22 1 2 1
In this case we can examine the first order conditions and solve for the price-cost margins as in
the clearinghouse agreement. We have the following expressions for the prices, and shares.
(p  - c)/p  =  (    +   f)/(    +   ) - [( (    -   ) d +        d )/ (    +   ) p ], for firm 1, ( 3)  1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
   (p  - c)/p  =  (    +   f)/(    +   ) - [( (    -   ) d )/ (    +   ) p ], for firm 2, and         (4) 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
 = (1/2) +   (lnp  - lnp )                       (1). 21
Lemma 2: There exists an asymmetric equilibrium under the delayed availability policy of
bank 1, characterized by the solutions to equations (1), (3) and (4), for sufficiently small d.
Proof: The equilibrium correspondence is continuous in d.  A symmetric equilibrium
exists when d = 0; for small values of d the equilibrium exists; and examination of (3) and (4)12
characterize the equilibrium.
II. 3. Direct presentment
Banks have the right of direct presentment of checks.  That is, by expending a cost, bank
2 can directly present checks to bank 1 and gain better availability.  Presentment is costly,
though, for both the collecting and paying bank.  We capture this costliness of presentment by
allowing the costs of collecting and paying for an on-other’s check, c  > 0 (however, these costs 0
apply only to interchange items; internal costs of item processing, h, remain 0).  We consider the
case in which both banks directly present checks to one another.  Hence both incur the cost c  in 0
collecting and paying for checks.  
Profits in this case are given by 
 =    [(p - c)q - f] -        c  ( q + q ) ; where i, j = 1,2, i û j. 
D
ii ii 1 2 0 j i
The first order conditions for the maximization of these expressions lead to expressions for the
price cost margins that are
(p - c)/p = (  +   f)/(  +   ) + [(  c) / (   +  )](1/p) - [ ((  -   )(c ))/(( + ) ( p  + p ))].(5) ii i i i 0 i i i j 0 i j i
2
Comparing equation (5) and equation (1), we see that in a symmetric equilibrium (when   =   ) ij
prices are higher when both banks directly present checks to one another than in the case of the
clearinghouse agreement.  Again, by continuity of the equilibrium correspondence we have
existence of equilibrium for small levels of c . 0
Lemma 3.  There is a unique symmetric equilibrium, characterized by equation (5), when
both banks directly present to one another, for levels of c  sufficiently small.  The prices from (5) 0
are strictly higher, and welfare is lower than in the case of the clearinghouse agreement.We’ve solved the model for various sizes of f, c, c , and d.  We used values of the
3
0
parameters in which both firms would be active in equilibrium.  The solutions reported here are
representative of all the model’s solutions with different sizes of f, c, c , and d. 0
13
III.  Simulation Results and Equilibrium Behavior
Bank 1 is assumed to set the terms of the clearinghouse agreement (or in any case to set
delayed availability for the collection of its checks).  Bank 2's only response is either to accept
the delayed availability and act according to the incentives it determines for bank 2 or to directly
present checks to bank 1.  Bank 1, in turn, directly presents checks to bank 2.  The banks’
strategic possibilities are shown in the game of Figure 1.  The payoffs to the game are determined
according to the pricing policies and associated equilibrium profits determined by the output and
check market behavior described above.
The banks are assumed to follow subgame perfect equilibrium strategies.  Hence, bank 2,
when forced to choose between accepting delayed availability or directly presenting checks, will
choose the option that yields it higher profit.  Bank 1 chooses between offering the symmetric
clearinghouse agreement or imposing delayed availability.  It does so knowing the outcome of
bank 2's deliberations, and choosing the option that yields it the highest profit.
III. 1. Simulation results 
We simulated the model for various sets of parameters.   The results of the simulations
3
are robust with respect to changes in f, c, d, and c .  We present (typical) simulation results for 0




c  = .0000125 0
The (direct) cost of direct presentment in this simulation is roughly ten times the (direct) cost of
delayed availability.  For costs of direct presentment much lower than this level, bank 2 always
prefers direct presentment to delayed availability, and the equilibrium outcome is the symmetric
clearinghouse agreement.
Simulations of the model using various parameter values yield the following result:
Result 1: For parameter values that yield equilibrium behavior in the check market, the
clearinghouse game has two possible equilibria: for levels of   sufficiently high, above some
level,     *, the symmetric clearinghouse agreement is the equilibrium; for levels of   below    *
the delayed availability outcome is the equilibrium.  Direct presentment is not an equilibrium. 
Lowering the cost of direct presentment, c , decreases the range over which delayed availability 0
is an equilibrium. 
Discussion. The proposition establishes   as a crucial parameter of the model. Let’s examine the
way payoffs, dependent on  , affect the decisions of the banks (  = (1/2t) is an index of the
substitutability of the banks’ services; t is the cost of transportation for consumers).  Consider the
situation under the symmetric clearinghouse agreement; under the assumption that h = 0, the
costs of on-us and on-others check transactions are equal.  Furthermore, the banks are symmetric
in their positions in the check market.  With these incentives, the banks’ pricing policies are
determined by their strategic interaction, which is more or less competitive as   is larger or
smaller.  With a larger  , each bank has an incentive to price more competitively because its
customers could be attracted to the other bank if the other bank’s prices are slightly lower; on the
other hand, with a lower  , customers are less prone to change banks because of small15
differences of price, and so both banks price at levels higher than the competitive level.
Under the delayed availability arrangement, the banks’ incentives are altered.  Bank 2
now faces higher “costs” for collecting the checks of bank 1 (because it suffers a delay of
availability), while still enjoying the zero cost of on-us checks.  There are two cases, depending
on how substitutable the banks’ services are for one another.  When   $ 1, bank 2 has an
incentive to lower its price, p , to attract customers and expand its market share in the retail 2
deposit market, so that it will receive a greater portion of the checks internally, and a smaller
percentage from bank 1's customers. Nonetheless, because of lower margins and the lost float
earnings, delayed availability results in lower profits for bank 2 than the bilateral clearinghouse
agreement.   
 When the banks’ services are quite poor substitutes, that is , when   < 1, the incentive to
lower price by bank 2 is blunted: bank 2 does so poorly at attracting customers that it instead
raises its prices in that region of the parameter space (thus losing market share), in effect passing
on its higher costs to its customers.  Bank 1 (as we will explain in more detail next) charges a
higher price than bank 2, so the prices of both firms are increased (relative to the symmetric
clearinghouse agreement) and both firms enjoy higher profits.  The delayed availability acts as a
device to collude, extracting rents from customers.
Bank 1, on the other hand, is enjoying the increased float earnings from checks collected
by bank 2, relative to its on-us checks.  Because of that, bank 1's incentive to raise its price is
stronger than bank 2's incentive to do so, and in equilibrium bank 1's price is higher than bank 2's
price.  Bank 1's increase in profits depends on the success of bank 2 in increasing its market
share.  If the banking market is highly competitive (i.e.,   is much larger than 1), bank 2 will win16
a significantly larger market share when it lowers its price.  In that case, the increased vigor of
the price competition generated by bank 2 swamps the increased float earnings generated by the
delayed availability policy.  If the market is less competitive (i.e.,   is small, but still possibly
greater than 1), delayed availability can work to the advantage of bank 1, and bank 1 will wish to
implement it.
Bank 2 can respond by directly presenting to bank 1.  Relative to the symmetric
clearinghouse agreement, directly presenting checks is costly and results in higher consumer
prices.  Profits, correspondingly, are reduced from their levels under a symmetric clearinghouse
agreement.  Whenever bank 2 prefers direct presentment to the delayed availability outcome,
bank 1 will not attempt to implement delayed availability in the first place.  Bank 2’s preference
for delayed availability is influenced by the size of c , the cost of paying and collecting on-others 0
items under direct presentment.  The larger c  is, the less likely it is that bank 2 prefers direct 0
presentment to delayed availability.
Figure 2 shows the difference in profits of bank 1 under the delayed availability strategy
and the profits under the symmetric clearinghouse agreement (multiplied by a scaling factor). 
Figure 3 shows the difference in profits of bank 2 under the delayed availability strategy and the
profits under direct presentment.  For all    < 6, Figure 2 shows that bank 1 prefers the delayed
availability strategy to the symmetric clearinghouse agreement. For all   < 4, bank 2 prefers
delayed availability to direct presentment.  Hence, for all   < 4, bank 1 will choose delayed
availability, and for   > 4, bank 1 will choose the symmetric clearinghouse agreement.  For 4 < 
< 6, bank 1 would prefer delayed availability, but were it to choose delayed availability, it would
find itself in the direct presentment outcome, which is less preferable than the symmetricThe magnitude of the differences in prices and profits across outcomes is rather small. 
4
This is an artifact of the logarithmic utility which we employ for tractability.  The following
calculation shows that the delayed availability cost is small relative to the resulting difference in
consumer welfare.  For   = .5, welfare falls by .0139 percent.  This decrease in welfare was
caused by the imposition, by bank 1, of a delayed availability “tax” of .0000001 per unit of
output.  In the symmetric clearinghouse agreement (at   = .5) bank 2 produces q = 49.95
(approximately), so its total tax (measured in a static sense) is roughly equal to
.0000001(.5)(49.95) = .000002498.  Its profits are approximately .249.  Hence the increased cost
as a percentage of its profits is .001.  In other words, the total tax is roughly a one-tenth of a basis
point subtraction from the firms profits (not from its total revenue; the cost represents only .0002
percent of total revenue, i.e. 2 one-hundredths of a basis point).  Nonetheless, the decrease in
social welfare is more than 1 basis point, a multiple of more than 50 times the amount of the tax
the firm pays as a percentage of its revenues (and more than 10 times the amount of the tax the
firm pays as a percentage of profit).
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clearinghouse agreement and so it will choose the symmetric clearinghouse agreement outcome. 
The tables in the appendix show prices, profits, market share for bank 1, and average per
capita welfare for a range of  , under the various arrangements.   
4
The simulation reveals an important consideration for policy in this market: welfare
varies with the equilibrium in the market.  
Result 2: In both equilibria, welfare rises with  .  In the delayed availability equilibrium, for
small levels of  , welfare is decreased from its level under the symmetric clearinghouse
agreement; as   rises (and if c  is sufficiently high), welfare is increased relative to the symmetric 0
clearinghouse agreement.
Discussion.  Figure 4 shows how welfare varies with   under the equilibrium outcomes.  Why is
welfare lower under delayed availability than under the symmetric clearinghouse agreement for
low levels of  ?  Because bank 2's incentive to lower its price to gain market share (in an attempt
to evade the “tax” of delayed availability) is muted when   is small.  The banks are sufficiently
poor substitutes that price decreases by bank 2 do not result in significant gains in market share,18
so bank 2 either raises its price or lowers it only marginally.  Bank 1 raises its price, and, as a
result, consumer welfare falls.  
As   rises, however, bank 2 has increased incentives to lower its price, and although bank
1 maintains its price above that of bank 2, it can set its price at a level below what its price would
be under the symmetric clearinghouse agreement and still earn greater profits under delayed
availability (consider   = 4 in the tables, for example).  In such a case, both banks charge lower
prices, and the consumer benefits from the increased price competition (at the expense of bank 2,
of course).
For   $ 1, as c  gets smaller, bank 2 tends to prefer direct presentment to delayed 0
availability.  However, for    < 1, for even very small levels of c , bank 2 prefers delayed 0
availability, because its profits are greater than they are even under the symmetric clearinghouse
agreement.  So with very small c , the only equilibrium delayed availability occurs when   < 1, in 0
which case welfare is definitely lower than under the symmetric clearinghouse agreement.
Results 1 and 2 characterize the outcomes of the model.  Delayed availability will be
employed by bank 1 to advantage itself relative to its rival so long as the retail banking market is
not too competitive.  When the banks do not compete for each other’s customers, that policy can
work to the advantage of bank 2.  When the banks are imperfect substitutes for one another, the
policy of delayed availability results in reduced welfare.  As the banks are better substitutes,
welfare can increase (relative to the symmetric clearinghouse agreement) because of the
increased vigor of price competition bank 2 engages in under delayed availability.  As the banks
become increasingly substitutable, the benefits to bank 1 from delaying the  availability of bank
2's checks are eroded by the price competition from bank 2.19
IV. Discussion and Interpretation
The model investigates a privatized check exchange system.  No Federal Reserve
processing facilities are described in the model.  What is the role of the Federal Reserve in this
model?  One interpretation consistent with this model is provided in part by Gilbert (1991).  In
that article, the Fed provides a competitive alternative to a bank clearinghouse.  With the Fed as a
next best alternative, a bank is offered a good contract with the clearinghouse; otherwise it can
use the Fed and receive availability nearly as good as that offered by the clearinghouse to their
most favored members.
The Fed clears checks nationwide.  By virtue of its ability to clear checks in all local
markets, it then acts as an outside option for those banks that are otherwise at risk of being
subject to the delayed availability equilibrium.  The model would suggest that the Fed would
operate in smaller markets, assuming that there are some scale economies in check clearing of
which a local bank could not take full advantage, and in markets that would otherwise be subject
to the delayed availability equilibrium, that is, concentrated banking markets. 
In which markets does the Fed do a significant share of the local check clearing?  The
markets in which the Fed does a significant share of the business are roughly characterized as
nonurban markets.  These are markets that are both relatively small and whose deposit
competition is significantly less competitive than urban market deposit competition.
Amel (1996) documents that the roughly 300 urban markets for depository services were
significantly less concentrated than the roughly 2600 nonurban markets, with the average
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) being 1300 for urban markets in 1994, and 3724 forThe HHI is an index of concentration in a market.  It is defined as the sum of squared
5
market shares of the firms in the market.
Hannan and Prager’s results show that decreases in market deposit rates (i.e., interest
6
rates paid on deposit accounts) are larger in markets that experience a substantial merger than in
markets that did not experience a substantial merger over the same period.  This result is
especially significant because of the potentially offsetting efficiency gains associated with such
mergers (which would tend to increase deposit rates), the truncated nature of the sample (large
mergers are not allowed), and the scrutiny all such mergers receive from the Department of
Justice.
20
nonurban markets.    Second, the recent work of Hannan and Prager (1996) showed significant
5
price effects from what they defined as substantial horizontal mergers in banking markets.   They
6
varied the definition, but in their basic results, a substantial merger was defined as one that
increased the HHI by at least 200 points, leaving a post-merger HHI of at least 1800.  That is a
level of concentration well above that found in most urban markets and below that found in
nonurban markets.  Their work complements that of Berger and Hannan (1989) who show that
structural concentration measures in banking markets result in pricing that is less advantageous to
consumers.  Amel (1996) and Berger and Hannan (1989) discuss some of the reasons that deposit
relationships can give rise to pricing power in concentrated markets, in contrast to other
industries, such as supermarkets, which also tend to be more concentrated in nonurban markets.
This interpretation then is that the Fed service tends to be more in demand in small
deposit markets and in deposit markets that are relatively noncompetitive.  The interpretation
would also point to areas in which the costs of direct presentment are relatively high as being
areas in which the Fed would be a more preferred alternative (otherwise the threat of direct
presentment would discipline bank 1 and a symmetric clearinghouse agreement would be
offered).  These areas would tend to be where direct presentment would require travel of longer21
distance than otherwise; again this would tend to be true in nonurban areas.
This interpretation of the model suggests that were the Fed to exit the provision of check
services, consumer welfare could either rise or fall.  The calculation to determine the effect on
welfare of the exit of the Fed would be to count the markets (in which delayed availability is the
equilibrium) in which   is in the range in which welfare is lowered (and calculate by how much),
count the markets in which   falls in the range in which welfare is raised (and calculate by how
much), and then sum the two amounts.
Do we have any suggestion about how this calculation might turn out?  One observation
is that the model is unrealistic in that consumers typically are grouped in towns (islands), rather
than being evenly distributed across space.  This observation might lead one to believe that the
incentives for bank 2 to lower its prices (the proximate cause for the increase in welfare under
delayed availability) are exaggerated in the model.  Bank 2 is unlikely to gain much market share
in other towns by lowering its price.  Another fact to consider is that check collection is typically
less concentrated than the pattern assumed in the model: one bank may, even in a relatively
concentrated market, only have one-third of its items processed as on-us.  In such an
unconcentrated check collection system, lowering one’s prices for deposits may not yield any
perceptible increase in on-us items.  Hence, bank 2 would have very weak incentives to lower its
prices.  On the other hand, another observation is that check writers do not typically write checks
in an isotropic pattern as assumed in the model.  If check writing is more locally confined to
towns, lowering price may lead to increased market share. 
What type of regulation of a privatized check market would be warranted under the
interpretation suggested here?  Bank 2 would wish to negotiate a clearinghouse agreement that22
would provide it substantially similar terms to those it received under the Fed’s provision of
services.  If bank 2 could ask for binding arbitration of the clearinghouse agreement (should it
not be offered favorable terms), then it would have the incentive to do so when the terms offered
fell short of its desires.  The Fed could arbitrate such conflicts.  This is quite similar to the role
the FCC will play under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 when firms do not believe they are
being offered fair terms of access to local telephone network facilities.  This regulation has the
potential to eliminate welfare-enhancing delayed availability arrangements as well as those that
tend to decrease welfare.
V. Summary and Conclusion
The model analyzed in this paper investigates the basic incentive that any bank or
clearinghouse has regarding access to its facilities (in this case its payment facilities): whether to
withhold its facilities from its rivals to gain advantages in the retail marketplace.   In
interconnected systems, each bank (or firm) is both a supplier of intermediate goods to its rivals,
as well as a rival.  The bank’s incentives to supply the intermediate goods can and will be
influenced by its attempt to gain advantages over the rival.  These incentives can lead either to
socially beneficial or costly competition.  The model here does not address other issues in check
exchange, such as remote presentment practices, but it is capable of addressing such issues. 
We construct and simulate a model of check exchange to examine the incentives a bank
has to delay the availability of check payment.  The potentially disadvantaged bank has the
option of directly presenting checks to the first bank.  We find that if the retail banking market is
highly competitive, the bank will not engage in such practices, but if the retail banking market is
imperfectly competitive, the bank will find it advantageous to restrict access to its facilities. 23
Lower costs of direct presentment can reduce (but not eliminate) the range over which these
practices are employed.  The practice of delayed presentment can either reduce or increase
welfare, again depending on the degree of competition in the market.  The model suggests that,
were the Federal Reserve System to exit the business of check processing, practices such as
delayed presentment would be more prevalent in smaller, concentrated markets, such as the
nonurban banking markets.24
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Appendix
Symmetric  = .5  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
Clearinghouse
Agreement




p , p .02000, .012513, .011261, .010844, .010636, 12
.02000 .012513 .011261 .010844 .010636
.5 .5 .5 .5 .5
W 2.66102 3.31853 3.45514 3.50329 3.52792
Delayed  = .5  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
Availability




p , p .020026 .012512, .011259, .010842, .010633, 12
.020029 .012509 .011256 .010839 .010630
.500010 .49962 .49896 .49830 .49764
W 2.66065 3.31868 3.45544 3.50366 3.5283226
Direct  = .5  = 2  = 4  = 6  = 8
Presentment
,  .24952, .09945, .05498, .03787, .02881,
DD
12
.24952 .09945 .05498 .03787 .02881
p , p .020026, .012514, .011262, .010845, .010636, 12
.020026 .012514 .011262 .010845 .010636
.5 .5 .5 .5 .5
W 2.66071 3.31840 3.45507 3.50325 3.52788